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Abstract—We present an optimized secure multi-antenna
transmission approach based on artificial-noise-aided beam-
forming, with limited feedback from a desired single-antenna
receiver. To deal with beamformer quantization errors as well
as unknown eavesdropper channel characteristics, our approach
is aimed at maximizing throughput under dual performance
constraints—a connection outage constraint on the desired com-
munication channel and a secrecy outage constraint to guard
against eavesdropping. We propose an adaptive transmission
strategy that judiciously selects the wiretap coding parameters,
as well as the power allocation between the artificial noise
and the information signal. This optimized solution reveals
several important differences with respect to solutions designed
previously under the assumption of perfect feedback. We also
investigate the problem of how to most efficiently utilize the
feedback bits. The simulation results indicate that a good design
strategy is to use approximately 20% of these bits to quantize
the channel gain information, with the remainder to quantize
the channel direction, and this allocation is largely insensitive
to the secrecy outage constraint imposed. In addition, we find
that 8 feedback bits per transmit antenna is sufficient to achieve
approximately 90% of the throughput attainable with perfect
feedback.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, adaptive transmission, limited
feedback, physical-layer security, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a means of providing enhanced security to wireless net-
works, physical-layer methods have been receiving consider-
able attention from the research community [2–5]. In this con-
text, secure techniques for various contemporary architectures
have now been considered, including multi-input multi-output
systems, relaying systems, cognitive-radio systems, and large-
scale networks (see [6–11] and references therein). A common
assumption in work on wireless physical-layer security is that
the transmitter has accurate knowledge of the channel to its
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desired communicating receiver, and in some cases also perfect
knowledge of the channel to the eavesdroppers. In general,
knowing the eavesdropper channels appears questionable in
practice, particularly if such eavesdroppers are “passive” and
remain quiet. In addition, typically only an approximation for
the desired communication channel may be assumed at the
transmitter; due, for example, to practical finite-rate constraints
on feedback links (which may be insecure) from the desired
receiver to the transmitter.
If multiple antennas are available at the transmitter, intelli-
gent signal processing may be used to provide security against
unknown passive eavesdroppers. This idea has been exploited
in [12–18], where artificial noise is generated in a controlled
manner to degrade the eavesdropper’s signal reception, while,
in theory, not causing additional noise at the desired receiver.
The solutions in [12–18] all assume perfect knowledge of the
desired receiver’s channel at the transmitter (utilized for ap-
propriate beamformer design). Recently, various contributions
have attempted to relax this requirement, allowing for certain
channel imperfections at the transmitter. In particular, the study
in [19–24] focused on the transmission design and analysis
when the channel of the desired receiver is assumed to be
known at the transmitter but with unbounded Gaussian errors.
This modeling is most appropriate for specifying errors caused
by imperfect channel estimation, but it does not model nor
address the problem of practical limited-feedback constraints.
Limited feedback channels are important in practice, par-
ticularly in widely-used frequency division duplex (FDD)
systems, for which the channel knowledge is typically obtained
at the receiver through the use of pilot training, and conveyed
to the transmitter through the use of digital feedback. Hence,
it is important to study secure transmission design under such
conditions with limited feedback constraints. Along this line,
only a limited amount of work has been done [25–28]. To
be specific, [25] characterized the ergodic secrecy rate per-
formance for single-antenna systems. With multiple transmit
antennas, [26] analyzed the secrecy outage probability in slow
fading channels without using artificial noise. For fast fading
channels, considering beamforming with artificial noise, [27]
provided optimal power allocation that maximizes the ergodic
secrecy rate in two asymptotic regions, while [28] derived a
lower bound to the ergodic secrecy capacity in integral form
and studied the optimal power allocation numerically.
In this paper, we consider a scenario where a multi-antenna
transmitter communicates with a desired single-antenna re-
ceiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, assuming that
there exists a limited-rate feedback channel from the desired
2receiver to the transmitter. Different from the single-antenna
system in [25], our transmitter is equipped with multiple
transmit antennas, thus providing more flexibility in signal
processing. Instead of the traditional beamforming approach
in [26], artificial-noise-aided beamforming is adopted in this
work to provide enhanced security performance. In contrast
to the fast fading channels in [27, 28], we consider a slow
fading scenario, and seek to design optimized artificial-noise-
aided transmission under suitably chosen outage performance
measures (as opposed to ergodic rate). Due to the limited
feedback constraint, a key challenge faced in the design
of artificial-noise-aided beamforming systems is the artificial
noise leakage into the desired communication channel, caused
by beamformer quantization errors. To deal with this issue,
while also accounting for the lack of eavesdropper chan-
nel knowledge, we present a novel optimized rate-adaptive
transmission approach aimed to maximize throughput under
dual performance constraints. The first is a connection out-
age constraint, which specifies a maximal outage level on
the desired communication channel; the second is a secrecy
outage constraint, which governs the level of security against
eavesdropping for a “worst-case” scenario with zero thermal
noise at the eavesdropper. We develop an adaptive transmission
strategy that judiciously selects the wiretap coding parameters
(i.e., the coding rate and the rate redundancy for achieving
secrecy), as well as the optimal power allocation between
the artificial noise and the information signal. Our optimized
solution reveals several important differences with respect to
solutions designed previously under the assumption of perfect
feedback [17], as well as providing practical engineering de-
sign insights and guidelines. These are summarized as follows.
1) In terms of maximizing the secrecy throughput, the
relative amount of available transmit power to allocate
to the information signal and the artificial noise depends
on the number of feedback bits and the total power
available. With additional feedback bits, the transmitter
gains confidence in regards to the desired communication
channel, and the optimal strategy is to allocate less power
to the information signal and give more to the artificial
noise. If the total available power is increased, with
limited feedback, the optimal power allocation strategy is
to give a larger fraction of this power to the information
signal and less to the artificial noise. This is in contrast
to the optimal power allocation strategy with perfect
knowledge of the desired communication channel (i.e.,
with unlimited feedback), for which the optimal power
split between the information signal and artificial noise
tends to be fixed as the transmit power grows large.
2) In our previous work [17], we showed that with per-
fect knowledge of the desired communication channel
(i.e., unlimited feedback), the secrecy throughput grows
unbounded with increasing transmit power. Here in this
paper, we point out that with only limited feedback from
the desired receiver, even with an arbitrarily large transmit
power, the secrecy throughput remains bounded.
3) Simulation results indicate that for a given total num-
ber of feedback bits, a good “rule of thumb” is to
allocate roughly 80% of the bits for specifying the
channel direction information (CDI), and the remainder
for specifying the channel gain information (CGI). This
allocation strategy gives near-optimal secrecy throughput
performance for a wide range of system parameters, and
in particular, its optimality is insensitive to the secrecy
outage constraint.
4) In terms of the number of feedback bits required, for
practical finite transmission powers, roughly 8 feedback
bits per antenna is sufficient to achieve 90% of the
secrecy throughput achievable with perfect knowledge
of the desired communication channel (i.e., unlimited
feedback).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
To model a slow-varying rich-scattering environment, we
consider Rayleigh fading channels that remain constant for
each message transmission and change independently from
one transmission to the next. The transmitter is equipped
with N ≥ 2 antennas, while the desired receiver and the
eavesdropper each has only a single antenna. The received
signal at the desired receiver can be written as
yd = h
Hx+ nd (1)
where h ∼ CN (0, IN ) is the desired communication chan-
nel, x is the transmitted vector, and nd ∼ CN
(
0, σ2d
)
is the
thermal noise. The received signal at the eavesdropper is
ye = g
Hx+ ne (2)
where g ∼ CN
(
0, σ2gIN
)
is the channel to the eavesdropper.
Note that here we did not specify a value for σ2g . Also, the
thermal noise level at the eavesdropper is typically unknown.
To facilitate a robust secure transmission design, we consider
a “worst-case” scenario with ne = 0.
A. Limited Feedback and Quantization
In this paper, we consider the situation with limited feed-
back [29–39] from the desired receiver and no feedback from
the eavesdropper. For each channel realization, the transmitter
first sends a sequence of training symbols. After receiving
these, the desired receiver and the eavesdropper both perform
channel estimation to obtain knowledge of their own channel,
which is assumed to be perfect. While the eavesdropper
does not disclose its channel information, the desired receiver
decomposes the obtained channel information h into the
CDI h/‖h‖ and the CGI ‖h‖, which are important for beam-
forming and rate-adaptation, respectively. This information is
conveyed to the transmitter via B feedback bits: B1 bits to
quantize the CDI and B2 = B−B1 bits to quantize the CGI.
Note that the CGI is real and positive, thus it can be quantized
efficiently using a small number of bits [37]. Meanwhile,
the CDI is a N -dimensional unit-norm complex vector. To
quantize the CDI, we choose 2B1 unit-norm vectors to form a
codebook C = {c1, . . . , c2B1 }, known at both the transmitter
and receiver. An index ℓˆ = argmaxℓ∈{1,...,2B1}
∣∣cHℓ h∣∣ is
computed by the receiver and fed back to the transmitter.
Therefore, cℓˆ is the quantized CDI available at the transmitter.
3A common method for generating the quantization code-
book C (though, used mainly for performance analysis pur-
poses) is to employ random vector quantization (RVQ), which
independently selects the codebook entries from a uniform
distribution on the unit complex hypersphere [31, 34, 35].
One can typically achieve better performance, however, with
properly designed deterministic quantization codebooks, and
these have been thoroughly investigated [32, 33]. In [32], for
example, the codebook design was addressed by relating to
the problem of Grassmannian line packing, and the result-
ing design criterion for a good quantization codebook was
to minimize the maximum correlation between any pair of
quantization vectors. The quantization codebooks used in this
paper are generated following this criterion.
For a codebook C, the quantization cell associated with cℓ ∈
C is given by Vℓ =
{
z|‖z‖ = 1,
∣∣zHcℓ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣zHcj∣∣ , ∀ j 6= ℓ}.
To facilitate our later analysis, as done in [32–37], we approx-
imate Vℓ by:
V˜ℓ =
{
z|‖z‖ = 1,
∣∣zHcℓ∣∣2 ≥ 1− 2− B1N−1} (3)
where the quantity 2−B1/(N−1) reflects the maximum quan-
tization error in the CDI. This approximation was first intro-
duced in [32, 33] and then used in [34]. The approximated
quantization cell can be viewed as a spherical cap on the unit
complex hypersphere. As will be seen later, this quantization
cell approximation not only allows one to characterize the
distribution of quantization error (see Lemma 6 in [35]), but
also provides an accurate performance indication for any well-
designed quantization codebook [32–37].
B. Artificial-Noise-Aided Beamforming
Denote the information signal by u ∼ CN
(
0, σ2u
)
. Define a
power allocation ratio φ as the ratio of the information signal
power σ2u to the total transmit power P . Thus, σ2u = Pφ. To
confuse the eavesdropper, the transmitter performs artificial-
noise-aided beamforming [12] by aligning the information
signal along the informed channel direction and injecting
artificial noise in orthogonal directions. To be specific, given ℓˆ,
the transmitted vector x in (1) admits:
x = cℓˆu+Wv (4)
where W is a N × (N − 1) complex matrix with
[
cℓˆ,W
]
being an orthonormal basis, and v ∼ CN
(
0, σ2vIN−1
)
is the
artificial noise vector with σ2v = P (1− φ) / (N − 1). Note
that this beamforming strategy does not require knowledge of
the CGI.
C. Wiretap Coding and Outages
Before transmission, the data is encoded using Wyner’s
well-known wiretap coding scheme [2]. The codeword rate and
the confidential information rate are denoted by Rb and Rs,
respectively. The codeword rate Rb is the actual transmission
rate of the codewords, while the confidential information
rate Rs is the rate of the embedded secret message, to be sent
to the desired receiver. The rate redundancy Re := Rb − Rs
provides secrecy against eavesdropping. More discussion on
code construction can be found in [40].
Without the eavesdropper’s instantaneous channel informa-
tion, the maximum confidential information rate with perfect
secrecy (i.e., the difference between the channel capacities
to the desired receiver and the eavesdropper) is unknown
and thereby unachievable. Furthermore, with only quantized
channel information of the desired receiver, the widely used
performance metric – outage probability of secrecy capac-
ity [4] – is no longer a suitable performance measure, as it does
not lead to any directly applicable wiretap coding scheme. In
this case, we appeal to a revised secrecy outage formulation
proposed in [41, 42] to exploit the statistical knowledge of the
quantization error and the eavesdropper’s channel. That is, we
choose the largest possible codeword rate Rb while keeping the
required decoding reliability at the desired receiver, and choose
the smallest possible rate redundancy Re while providing
the required security performance against eavesdropping, both
from a probabilistic sense. By doing so, we maximize the
achievable confidential information rate Rs = Rb−Re, which
is delivered to the desired receiver while the risks of decoding
error and being eavesdropped are both under control. More
specifically, if the channel from the transmitter to the desired
receiver cannot support Rb, the transmitted message cannot be
decoded correctly and we consider this a connection outage
event. If the channel from the transmitter to the eavesdropper
can support a data rate larger than Re, perfect secrecy cannot
be achieved and a secrecy outage event is deemed to occur.
In the next section, we first characterize the connection and
secrecy outage probabilities.
III. OUTAGE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze the connection and secrecy
outage performance of the artificial-noise-aided beamforming
scheme with limited feedback.
A. Connection Outage Probability
The connection outage probability is defined as the proba-
bility that the capacity of the desired communication channel
falls below a preselected codeword rate Rb. Denote the instan-
taneous CDI by d = h/‖h‖. Given a feedback index ℓˆ, the
CDI available at the transmitter is cℓˆ. Define
cos2 θ :=
∣∣dHcℓˆ∣∣2 (5)
to reflect how well the obtained CDI aligns with the exact
channel direction.
By (1) and (4), the signal at the desired receiver is
yd = ‖h‖d
Hcℓˆu+ ‖h‖d
HWv + nd
with the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
SINRd =
‖h‖2
∣∣dHcℓˆ∣∣2 σ2u
‖h‖2‖dHW‖2σ2v + σ
2
d
=
‖h‖2 cos2 θσ2u
‖h‖2 (1− cos2 θ)σ2v + σ
2
d
(6)
4which follows (5) and the fact that ∣∣dHcℓˆ∣∣2 + ‖dHW‖2 = 1.
The first term in the denominator comes from the artificial
noise that leaks into the desired communication channel due
to limited feedback and inaccurate beamforming.
To the transmitter, the quantization error in the obtained CDI
is unknown, and the instantaneous SINR (i.e., for a given h) at
the desired receiver is random. As such, the connection outage
probability can be expressed as
pco (Rb, φ,h) := Pr (log2 (1 + SINRd) ≤ Rb) .
Since the optimal quantization codebook is generally un-
known, in this paper, we consider the quantization cell ap-
proximation in (3). Based on this approximation, an approx-
imated distribution for the “quantization error” 1 − cos2 θ,
where cos2 θ is defined in (5), was provided in Lemma 6
of [35]. Using this result, by (6), our connection outage
probability pco can be approximated by
p˜co (Rb, φ, ‖h‖) (7)
=


0 for Rb≤R1
1−2B1
(
‖h‖2Pφ−σ2d(2
Rb−1)
‖h‖2(Pφ+P (1−φ)N−1 (2Rb−1))
)N−1
for R1<Rb≤R2
1 for Rb>R2
where
R1 = log2

1 + ‖h‖2Pφ
(
1− 2−
B1
N−1
)
‖h‖2 P (1−φ)N−1 2
−
B1
N−1 + σ2d


R2 = log2
(
1 +
‖h‖2Pφ
σ2d
)
.
The first boundary value R1 is the capacity of the desired
communication channel with maximum quantization error
in the CDI. Therefore, R1 is also the maximum data rate
achievable without causing connection outages. The second
boundary value R2 represents the capacity of the desired
communication channel with perfect channel knowledge at the
transmitter side. Note that p˜co and R1 are both functions of the
number of feedback bits used for the CDI B1. As B1 → ∞,
R1 → R2 and p˜co approaches a step function at Rb = R2.
When the number of feedback bits used for the CDI is not too
small (e.g., B1 ≥ 3N ), (7) provides an accurate approximation
for the actual connection outage probability.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probability pso is defined as the proba-
bility that the channel capacity to the eavesdropper exceeds a
preselected rate redundancy Re. By (2) and (4), the received
signal at the eavesdropper admits
ye = g
Hcℓˆu+ g
HWv
with corresponding signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
SIRe =
∣∣gHcℓˆ∣∣2 σ2u
‖gHW‖2σ2v
.
Though the eavesdropper’s channel is unknown to the trans-
mitter, by [17, eq. (5)], the secrecy outage probability can be
computed as
pso (Re, φ) := Pr (log2 (1 + SIRe) ≥ Re)
=
(
1 +
(
2Re − 1
)(φ−1 − 1
N − 1
))1−N
(8)
which is independent of the informed channel direction cℓˆ,
and thus of the desired communication channel h. Here,
as a robust design, we ignored the thermal noise at the
eavesdropper. Hence, the SIR at the eavesdropper becomes
distance-independent, due to the fact that both the signal and
the interference come from the same point of transmission.
Therefore, the derived expression for the secrecy outage prob-
ability is valid for an eavesdropper located at an arbitrary
distance. In the literature [43, 44], a zero-noise assumption is
also used to represent the scenario where the eavesdropper
is located arbitrarily close to the transmitter. If the analysis
holds true for this case, as one may expect, it is also valid
when the eavesdropper is located at a certain (but unknown)
distance from the transmitter, due to distance attenuation. In
general, our analysis allows the eavesdropper to be located
at an arbitrary distance from the transmitter, with the only
constraint that the Rayleigh fading assumption still holds.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION DESIGN
In the last section, we analyzed the connection and se-
crecy outage probabilities of artificial-noise-aided beamform-
ing scheme with limited feedback. To guarantee the reliability
performance of desired communication and the secrecy per-
formance against eavesdropping, we specify a connection and
a secrecy outage constraint, respectively. For a given channel
realization, the design target is to maximize the confidential
information rate under the dual connection and secrecy outage
constraints. By averaging the maximum confidential informa-
tion rate over all channel realizations, we can then investigate
the average secrecy throughout performance.
In this section, considering that the CGI is just a positive
scalar, which is relatively easy to quantize, we temporarily
assume that the transmitter is well-informed about the CGI.
In other words, the channel gain is assumed to be accurately
known at the transmitter. We then focus on the secure transmis-
sion design with quantized CDI and will consider quantization
for the CGI in the next section. The main problem we study
can be summarized as follows.
Problem 1. What are the optimal transmission design param-
eters that maximize the confidential information rate, under
dual connection and secrecy outage constraints?
For a given realization of the desired communication chan-
nel h, recalling that the confidential information rate is given
by the difference between the codeword rate and the rate
redundancy Rs = Rb −Re, Problem 1 can be expressed as
R∗s (h) = max
Rb,Re,φ
[Rb −Re]
+
s.t. p˜co (Rb, φ, ‖h‖) ≤ σ, pso (Re, φ) ≤ ǫ (9)
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connection and secrecy outage constraints. Since an exact
expression for pco seems unavailable, here we use its ap-
proximation p˜co, provided in (7). Meanwhile, pso was derived
in (8) without any approximation. Here we point out that
with our design strategy, the outage probability of secrecy
capacity [4], i.e., Pr {Cs < R∗s}, where Cs is the unknown
secrecy capacity given by the capacity difference between the
desired receiver and the eavesdropper, is also guaranteed to be
smaller than σ+ ǫ. This can be proved by invoking the union
bound technique and here the proof is omitted for brevity.
The solution to the optimization problem in eq. (9) is also
the answer to the question we asked in Problem 1. That is,
solving the optimization problem in eq. (9) will give us the
maximum confidential information rate that can be delivered
to the desired receiver while the risks of decoding errors and
being eavesdropped are both under control.
A. Conditions for Secure Transmission
The optimization problem in (9) may not always have a
positive solution. This occurs when, under dual connection
and secrecy outage constraints, the maximum confidential
information rate R∗s is strictly zero. Here, we establish the
necessary and sufficient conditions on the system parameters
under which a positive R∗s can be achieved.
Define ⌈x⌉ as the smallest positive integer which is larger
than x. We first present a condition on the number of feedback
bits used for the CDI.
Proposition 1. Under the dual outage constraints in (9), for
a positive confidential information rate to be achievable, the
number of feedback bits used for the CDI must satisfy:
B1 ≥ B
min
1 :=
⌈
log2
(
1− σ
ǫ
)⌉
. (10)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Here Bmin1 is the minimum number of feedback bits, above
which a positive confidential information rate is achievable.
This minimum requirement is established under the best
possible situation where the desired receiver is free of thermal
noise, i.e., nd = 0. As can be seen from (6), assuming zero
noise for the desired receiver is equivalent to assuming that
the desired communication channel has an arbitrarily large
strength ‖h‖.
From (10), we make the following observations:
• For a given connection outage constraint σ, an exponential
reduction in the secrecy outage constraint ǫ necessitates a
linear increase in Bmin1 . Moreover, as ǫ → 0, Bmin1 → ∞,
implying that as the secrecy outage constraint becomes more
and more stringent, an arbitrarily large number of feedback
bits is required to achieve any non-zero confidential infor-
mation rate. This is a consequence of the fact that a more
stringent outage constraint ǫ translates to a larger required
rate redundancyRe, and therefore a larger codeword rate Rb,
for the confidential information rate Rs = Rb − Re to be
positive. With all else fixed, this can obviously be obtained
by improving the quality of the desired communication
channel through additional feedback bits.
• Similarly, for a given secrecy outage constraint ǫ, an ex-
ponential reduction in the connection outage constraint σ
towards zero (i.e., an exponential increase in 1− σ towards
one) necessitates a linear increase in Bmin1 . Moreover, as
σ → 0, Bmin1 → ⌈log2 (1/ǫ)⌉, implying that as the
connection outage constraint is made more stringent, the
required number of feedback bits grows, as above, but
in this case it remains bounded. That is, unlike secrecy
outages, connection outages can be avoided, provided that
the number of feedback bits exceeds this limiting bound.
This phenomena, while not immediately obvious, is due to
the fact that with a well-designed quantization codebook,
the CDI errors due to limited feedback are strictly upper
bounded, and these can be made arbitrarily small as the
number of feedback bits increases. Indeed, there comes a
point in which the codeword rate Rb, when matched to
the capacity of the desired communication channel under
a worst-case quantization noise assumption (thus, avoid-
ing connection outages), can still exceed the required rate
redundancy Re, thereby leading to a positive confidential
information rate Rs.
• Interestingly, the condition in (10) shows no dependence
at all on the number of transmit antennas N . This result
is not immediately intuitive, due to the dependence of N
on different aspects of the system. To examine this, first
recall that this achievability condition is established under
the assumption that the desired receiver is free of thermal
noise. In this case, as can be seen from (6), the SINR
at the desired receiver depends on the angular mismatch
between the beamformer and the channel vector, but not the
channel strength. (Thus, the additional array gain available
to the beamformer by increasing the number of antennas is
inconsequential.) Moreover, increasing N leads to a larger
quantization error in the CDI, and this in turn leads to an
increased connection outage probability. Consequently, in
order to meet the specified connection outage constraint,
the transmitter must employ a reduced codeword rate. In
contrast to these negative effects, increasing N allows higher
dimensionality for the generated artificial noise, which in
turn provides additional protection against eavesdropping
and thus a reduced secrecy outage probability. In terms of
rate, this implies that the transmitter can use a smaller rate
redundancy to satisfy the same secrecy outage constraint.
What is most curious is that, as implied by (10), the
reduction of both rates (i.e., Rb due to increased connection
outages and Re due to reduced secrecy outages) as N is
increased is the same, such that the difference between
them Rs is unaffected.
Table I gives some example values for Bmin1 in (10) for
different connection and secrecy outage constraints. Here, we
see that the number of feedback bits required to get a non-zero
confidential information rate is generally small.
Now we consider the case where the thermal noise at the
desired receiver is non-negligible (i.e., nd 6= 0). In this case,
to achieve a positive confidential information rate, in addition
to the number of feedback bits needed to satisfy (10), the
strength of the desired communication channel must also be
6Table I
REQUIRED FEEDBACK BITS FOR CDI Bmin
1
Bmin
1
ǫ
1 0.1 0.01 0.001
σ
1 1 1 1 1
0.1 1 4 7 10
0.01 1 4 7 10
sufficiently large, as indicated in the following:
Proposition 2. Assuming the condition in (10) is satisfied, to
achieve a positive confidential information rate, the strength
of the desired communication channel must also satisfy:
‖h‖2 > µmin :=
(N − 1)
(
N−1
√
1
ǫ − 1
)
P
(
1− N−1
√
1−σ
2B1ǫ
) σ2d. (11)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Here µmin is the minimum strength of the desired communi-
cation channel required for a positive confidential information
rate to be achievable. From a design perspective, (11) implies
that one should adopt an “on-off” transmission scheme [41],
with a transmit threshold µmin.
Actually, the condition in (11) is closely related to that
in (10). Since (10) was derived assuming zero thermal noise,
it is independent of the strength of the desired communication
channel. Now, this fact can also be observed from (11). That
is, when nd = 0 (thus σ2d = 0), the requirement on the channel
strength disappears (it simply needs to be greater than zero).
When the thermal noise at the desired receiver becomes non-
negligible (i.e., σ2d 6= 0), to compensate for this effect, while
the lower bound on the required number of feedback bits does
not change, a requirement on the channel strength comes up,
as given in (11).
One may interpret the interplay between the conditions
in (10) and (11) from a stochastic point of view. To this end,
first note that the CGI ‖h‖ is randomly distributed on [0,∞).
As B1 approaches the theoretical lower limit log2 [(1− σ) /ǫ],
the denominator in (11) approaches zero and the transmit
threshold µmin becomes arbitrarily large. Thus, the probability
of the event {‖h‖2 > µmin}, and consequently the probability
of achieving a positive confidential information rate, tends to
zero. Clearly, the larger the number of feedback bits B1 (i.e., as
it grows beyond its lower limit log2 [(1− σ) /ǫ]), the smaller
the threshold µmin, and thus the greater the probability of
achieving a positive confidential information rate.
B. Optimized Transmission Design
Having discussed the conditions under which a positive
confidential information rate is achievable, we now provide
a closed-form solution to the optimization problem in (9).
Theorem 1. Assume that the conditions in (10) and (11) are
satisfied. The optimal choices of the transmission rates (Rb
and Re) and the power allocation ratio φ in (9) are given by
φ∗=
(
β+σ2d
)
(α−βγ)−
√
α−βγ+σ2d(1−γ)
√
αγσ2d(β+σ
2
d)
β(α−βγ)+ασ2d(1−γ)
R∗b = log2
(
1 +
αφ∗
β (1− φ∗) + σ2d
)
R∗e = log2
(
1 + γ
φ∗
1− φ∗
)
(12)
where
α = ‖h‖2P
(
1−
N−1
√
1− σ
2B1
)
β =
‖h‖2P
N − 1
N−1
√
1− σ
2B1
γ = (N − 1)
(
N−1
√
1
ǫ
− 1
)
. (13)
The corresponding (strictly positive) maximum confidential
information rate is therefore
R∗s
(
‖h‖2
)
= R∗b −R
∗
e . (14)
Proof: See Appendix C.
It turns out that for the maximum confidential information
rate R∗s in (14), the desired communication channel h ap-
pears only in the form of ‖h‖2. Thus, to facilitate our later
analysis, here we have slightly abused notation and written it
as R∗s
(
‖h‖2
)
, rather than R∗s (h) as in (9).
Note that for the optimization problem in (9), the approxi-
mated connection outage probability in (7) was used. Hence,
the maximum confidential information rate in (14) is also an
approximation. In Fig. 1, we compare (14) with the exact
maximum confidential information rate, found by inverting the
simulated connection outage probability and optimizing the
transmit power allocation numerically. The quantization code-
books are generated based on the design criterion in [32, 33].
As can be seen, the difference between the exact result and
our analytical approximation is almost negligible. That is to
say, the considered quantization cell approximation has only a
negligible effect on the optimality of the proposed transmission
design and the solution derived based on the quantization cell
approximation accurately predicts the maximum achievable
confidential information rate.
Based on (12), we find the following:
• As demonstrated in Fig. 2, for a given transmit power P , the
optimal power allocation ratio φ∗ decreases with increasing
number of feedback bits used for the CDI B1. This implies
that, if more feedback bits are available, then one should
allocate more transmit power to the artificial noise, and
less power to the information signal. This may be counter-
intuitive, as one could expect the transmitter to give a larger
fraction of power to the information signal when it gets more
confident about the desired communication channel (the idea
of allocating more power to higher quality channels is the
basis of conventional waterfilling algorithms, for example).
However, with the secrecy constraint, it is the achievable
rate difference that matters, not only the capacity of the
desired communication channel, and the bottleneck affecting
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Figure 1. Maximum confidential information rate R∗s versus the transmit
power P for different connection outage constraints σ. Results are shown for
the case where σ2
d
= 1, N = 2, B1 = 6, ǫ = 0.05 and ‖h‖ = 2.
the achievable rate difference is the unknown channel of
the eavesdropper. With more feedback bits, generating extra
artificial noise would have reducing effect on the desired
communication channel (approaching asymptotic orthogo-
nality), but could effectively degrade the eavesdropper’s sig-
nal reception, giving an improved confidential information
rate. We also have limB1→∞ φ∗ = φ∗perfect, where φ∗perfect
is the optimal power allocation ratio with perfect knowledge
of the desired communication channel, derived previously in
[17, eq. (29)].
• As demonstrated in Fig. 3, for a given number of feedback
bits used for the CDI B1, the optimal power allocation
ratio φ∗ increases with the transmit power P . This implies
that, if extra transmit power is available, then one should
allocate more transmit power to the information signal, and
less power to the artificial noise. An intuitive explanation
can be given as follows. With a fixed number of feed-
back bits, the desired communication channel has certain
advantage over the eavesdropper’s channel. By giving a
larger fraction of the transmit power to the information
signal, this advantage can be further expanded. That is, the
increase in the supported codeword rate is larger than that
in the required rate redundancy, leading to an improved
confidential information rate. Given a finite B1, we also have
limP→∞ φ
∗ = 1, implying that with limited feedback and an
arbitrarily large transmit power, the confidential information
rate is maximized when the transmitter gives all of its power
to the information signal. This observation is quite different
from the case with perfect knowledge of the desired commu-
nication channel, where limP→∞ φ∗perfect < 1 [17, eq. (31)].
With limited feedback, as P →∞, by using a larger power
allocation ratio, both the supported codeword rate and the
required rate redundancy increase unbounded. However, the
difference between them, i.e., the confidential information
rate, increases to a finite asymptote. With perfect knowledge
of the desired communication channel, as P →∞, if a cer-
tain fraction of the transmit power is reserved for generating
artificial noise to limit the eavesdropper’s signal reception
and thereby the required rate redundancy, the confidential
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compared with the case of accurate CDI. Results are shown for the case where
σ2
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information rate can be made arbitrarily large. This is why
different power allocation strategies are observed in the
asymptotic region where P →∞.
C. Secrecy Throughput Performance
In the last subsection, for a given realization of the desired
communication channel, we maximized the data rate which is
delivered to the desired receiver while the risks of decoding
error and being eavesdropped are under control. In this subsec-
tion, we investigate the secrecy throughput performance. To be
specific, the secrecy throughput is defined as the confidential
information rate averaged over all channel realizations, taking
into account the probability of connection outage σ, given by
η = (1− σ)Eh
[
R∗s
(
‖h‖2
)]
(bits/channel use).
Assuming that the number of feedback bits used for the
CDI B1 is chosen to satisfy (10) , and with the optimized
transmission design provided in Theorem 1, the corresponding
8secrecy throughput is
η = (1− σ)
∫ ∞
µmin
R∗s (z) f‖h‖2 (z) dz (15)
where the transmit threshold µmin is defined in (11) and for
z > 0, f‖h‖2 (z) = z
N−1e−z/(N − 1)!.
In [17, eq. (35)], we showed that with perfect knowledge
of the desired communication channel, the secrecy throughput
grows unbounded (logarithmically) with increasing transmit
power. With limited feedback, we present the following re-
mark.
Remark 1. From (12)–(15), as the transmit power grows large,
the secrecy throughput converges to a finite asymptote:
lim
P→∞
η = (1− σ) log2

 N−1
√
2B1
1−σ − 1
N−1
√
1
ǫ − 1

 . (16)
By adding extra feedback bits (i.e., increasing B1), the
throughput limit in (16) will be increased, as one may expect.
An explanation for the observed convergence is given as
follows:
• With perfect knowledge of the desired communication chan-
nel, by increasing the transmit power P , the optimal power
allocation ratio φ∗perfect in [17, eq. (29)] increases to an
asymptote which is strictly less than one. Therefore, the rate
redundancy required to satisfy the secrecy outage constraint
is limited to a constant value. Meanwhile, the supported
codeword rate grows unbounded with increasing P , and this
is why the secrecy throughput with perfect knowledge of the
desired communication channel increases to infinity, as can
be seen from [17, eq. (35)].
• With quantized CDI feedback from the desired receiver,
by increasing the transmit power P , the optimal power
allocation ratio φ∗ in (12) increases towards one. Conse-
quently, the rate redundancy required to satisfy the secrecy
outage constraint increases towards infinity (which is not the
case with perfect knowledge of the desired communication
channel). Though the supported codeword rate also increases
with increasing P , the difference between the supported
codeword rate and the required rate redundancy converges
to a certain value. This is why the secrecy throughput
with quantized CDI feedback converges to (16) instead of
growing unbounded with increasing P .
Thus far, we have considered the outage constraints, ǫ and σ,
as fixed. One may also ask how the specific choice of ǫ
and σ influence the throughput performance of our optimized
transmission scheme in Theorem 1. This is investigated in
Fig. 4, which plots the secrecy throughput versus the connec-
tion and secrecy outage constraints. As can be seen, for any
given connection outage constraint, strengthening the secrecy
outage constraint would reduce the achievable throughput, as
one may expect. On the other hand, if the secrecy outage
constraint is fixed while the connection outage constraint is
varied, different behavior is observed depending on the specific
value of the secrecy constraint. In particular, if the secrecy
constraint is not too strong (e.g., the curve highlighted for
ǫ = 0.033), then the secrecy throughput is maximized with
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Figure 4. Secrecy throughput η versus the connection and secrecy outage
constraints σ and ǫ. Results are shown for the case where σ2
d
= 1, N = 4,
P = 10 and B1 = 8.
as few connection outages as possible; while if the secrecy
constraint is sufficiently strong (e.g., the curve highlighted for
ǫ = 0.009), then allowing for connection outages (and for
this example, quite a lot of outages) can indeed lead to an
increased throughput. This observation suggests that a worst-
case assumption (i.e., no connection outages allowed, thereby
assuming maximum quantization error) does not necessarily
yield the maximum secrecy throughput. That is to say, instead
of simply assuming maximum quantization error, exploiting
the statistical knowledge of the quantization error due to lim-
ited feedback can indeed provide a better secrecy throughput.
V. QUANTIZATION OF CHANNEL GAIN INFORMATION
Up to this point, as in [35, 37], we have assumed that
the CGI is accurately known at the transmitter. In practice,
however, this will need to be quantized, along with the CDI.
Here we explicitly account for this issue. Specifically, we
address the following problem:
Problem 2. How to quantize the CGI and what is the
corresponding secrecy throughput, under dual connection and
secrecy outage constraints?
With different numbers of feedback bits allocated to quan-
tize the CGI, we consider different transmission/quantization
schemes. Recall that we use B2 feedback bits to quantize
the CGI. When B2 = 1, an on-off transmission scheme is
adopted, where the rate parameters and power allocation ratio
are chosen to take fixed values, and the feedback bit indicates
whether to transmit or not. When B2 ≥ 2, we use a multi-stage
quantization scheme to enable adaptive transmission, where
the rate parameters and power allocation ratio are chosen based
on the feedback about the strength of the desired channel. Each
scheme is now discussed in turn.
A. One-Bit CGI Feedback
When B2 = 1, this single bit can be used to indicate if
the channel strength is above a certain threshold, and thus
the transceiver can perform a fixed-rate on-off transmission.
More specifically, define m = 1{‖h‖2≥µT }, where 1{·} is the
9indicator function and µT is a preselected threshold. The case
m = 0 implies that the transmission should be suspended.
Alternatively, if m = 1, the transmitter conducts transmission
using the optimized design provided in Theorem 1, and assum-
ing that the squared amplitude of the desired communication
channel is taking its smallest possible value: ‖h‖2 = µT . In
this way, the connection and secrecy outage constraints in (9)
are both satisfied.
From (15), the secrecy throughput with one-bit CGI feed-
back is given by
η = (1− σ)R∗s (µT ) Γ˜ (N,µT ) (17)
where R∗s (·) was derived previously in (14) and Γ˜ (·, ·) is
the regularized upper incomplete gamma function, defined as
Γ˜ (N, x) = e−x
∑N−1
k=0 x
k/k!.
As mentioned previously, if ‖h‖2 ≤ µmin, defined in (11),
then R∗s
(
‖h‖2
)
= 0. Hence, the transmit threshold should
be chosen as µT > µmin. Note in addition that as µT → ∞,
R∗s (µT ) increases to a finite asymptote, while Γ˜ (N,µT ) tends
to zero; thus, the throughput in (17) also approaches zero.
Based on these two observations, we numerically optimize µT
in the range (µmin,∞) to maximize the secrecy throughput.
B. Multiple-Bit CGI Feedback
When B2 ≥ 2, the transceiver can perform rate-adaptive
transmission, where the rate choice belongs to a finite set,
bounded by the number of quantization steps. In this case,
the throughput-optimal CGI quantization scheme is difficult to
characterize. Here, we consider a quantization scheme which
is reasonably easy to implement and also provides a good
throughput performance with a relatively small number of
quantization bits.
We first define the inverse function for the regularized upper
incomplete gamma function x = Γ˜−1 (N, y) such that y =
Γ˜ (N, x). Though there is no closed-form expression for this
function, standard software packages such as Matlab provide
well-developed routines for numerical evaluation.
From the conditions in (10) and (11), we know that it is
unnecessary to quantize the range ‖h‖2 < µmin. Meanwhile,
though the CGI ‖h‖ may take large values, the corresponding
probabilities are typically small. Hence, we consider quanti-
zation for the CGI in a bounded interval µ1 < ‖h‖2 ≤ µ2,
where µ1 = Γ˜−1
(
N, Γ˜ (N,µmin)− δ
)
, µ2 = Γ˜−1 (N, δ),
with δ as a small positive constant. The upper limit µ2
is introduced to truncate large CGI values appearing with
only small probability, while the lower limit µ1 > µmin
is invoked to improve the quantization efficiency. (A more
detailed explanation of this second condition will be given
subsequently.) The value of δ will be chosen to make sure
that µ1 < µ2 and to cover an appropriate subset [µ1, µ2] of
[µmin,∞).
The key idea of the considered quantization scheme is to
divide the range between µ1 and µ2 into 2B2 − 2 quantization
intervals, such that ‖h‖2 has the same probability of falling
into each interval. This is a quite simple scheme, analogous to
the “histogram equalization” approach used in image process-
ing [45], which we will refer to as “equalized quantization”.
To be precise, for any given CGI ‖h‖ ∈ (0,∞), the receiver
generates an index m through (18) on the top of the next page,
where k ∈
{
1, . . . , 2B2 − 2
}
. The value of m is then fed back
to the transmitter.
At the transmitter side, when m = 0 is received, transmis-
sion is suspended. When m ∈
{
1, . . . , 2B2 − 1
}
is received,
it applies the optimized design provided in Theorem 1, by
assuming that the squared amplitude of the desired commu-
nication channel is at its smallest value possible, given the
quantization value m:
‖h‖2=Γ˜−1
(
N, Γ˜(N,µ1)−(m−1)
Γ˜(N,µ1)−Γ˜(N,µ2)
2B2−2
)
. (19)
In this way, the connection and secrecy outage constraints
in (9) are both satisfied. This worst-case assumption is also
the reason why we choose µ1 > µmin: From (14), we know
that R∗s (µmin) = 0. Then, if we were to set µ1 = µmin,
with the worst-case assumption above, the first quantization
interval after µ1 is wasted. Moreover, choosing µ1 in excess
of µmin allows one to impose a lower bound on the achievable
confidential information rate R∗s (µ1) that must be satisfied,
before transmission is conducted. This, in turn, results in more
efficient use of the available quantization bits.
With the proposed equalized quantization scheme for the
CGI, from (15), the secrecy throughput becomes
η = (1− σ)
Γ˜ (N,µ1)− Γ˜ (N, µ2)
2B2 − 2
×
2
B2−2∑
m=1
R
∗
s
(
Γ˜−1
(
N, Γ˜(N, µ1)−(m−1)
Γ˜(N,µ1)−Γ˜(N,µ2)
2B2−2
))
+ (1− σ)R∗s (µ2) Γ˜ (N,µ2)
where R∗s (·) is given in (14).
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy throughput achieved with the CGI
quantization scheme introduced above. Here, the number of
bits used for quantizing the CDI B1 is kept fixed, while the
number of bits used for quantizing the CGI B2 is varied. We
see that with only four or five bits, the equalized quantization
scheme provides a throughput performance which is close to
that achieved with perfect CGI knowledge (i.e., B2 →∞).
C. Allocation of Feedback Bits between CDI and CGI
In practice, a single feedback channel is used for conveying
both quantized CDI and CGI. Thus, an interesting problem
emerges:
Problem 3. For a given number of feedback bits, what is the
most efficient allocation between the CDI and CGI in order
to maximize the secrecy throughput?
To study this problem, we first define τ = B2/B, which we
term the “feedback bits allocation ratio”. Clearly, τ represents
the fraction of bits allocated to the CGI, while 1−τ represents
the fraction of bits allocated to the CDI. While difficult to
characterize Problem 3 analytically, we will study this problem
through simulations.
Intuitively, giving too few feedback bits to either the CGI or
the CDI (i.e., with τ sufficiently close to zero or one respec-
tively) will lead to a degraded secrecy throughput. Fig. 6 shows
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m=

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0 for ‖h‖2<µ1
k for Γ˜−1
(
N,Γ˜(N,µ1)−(k−1)
Γ˜(N,µ1)−Γ˜(N,µ2)
2B2−2
)
≤‖h‖2< Γ˜−1
(
N,Γ˜(N,µ1)−k
Γ˜(N,µ1)−Γ˜(N,µ2)
2B2−2
)
2B2−1 for ‖h‖2≥µ2
(18)
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Figure 5. Secrecy throughput η versus the transmit power P , with quantized
CGI, compared with the case of accurate CGI. Results are shown for the case
where σ2
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the optimal τ that maximizes the secrecy throughput, i.e., τ∗,
against the secrecy outage constraint ǫ for different numbers of
antennas N . We see that for the scenario considered, τ∗ ≈ 0.2.
This number is rather small, but nonetheless intuitive. The
CGI is just a positive scalar, which does not require many
bits to quantize; while the CDI requires quantization of a N -
dimensional complex vector (under norm constraints), in order
to accurately specify the beamforming direction. Moreover,
this optimal allocation ratio is insensitive to changes in the
secrecy outage constraint.
Based on the observations above, we claim the following:
With limited feedback, to maximize the secrecy throughput,
a good “rule of thumb” is to allocate roughly 20% of the
feedback bits for quantizing the CGI, and the remainder for
quantizing the CDI.
10−2 10−1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Secrecy Outage Constraint, ǫ
R
eq
u
ir
ed
F
ee
d
b
a
ck
B
it
s
p
er
A
n
te
n
n
a
N = 4,5,6
Figure 7. Required number of feedback bits per antenna for achieving 90% of
the secrecy throughput with perfect knowledge of the desired communication
channel versus the secrecy outage constraint ǫ, for different number of transmit
antennas N . Results are shown for the case where σ2
d
= 1, P = 20, σ = 0.03
and δ = 0.0001.
In addition to the specific parameterizations considered in
Fig. 6, this claim was also found to be valid over a wider
selection of parameters (e.g., P , B and σ). We do not report
these additional simulation results here, for conciseness.
D. Quantization Efficiency
With optimized feedback allocation between the CDI and
CGI, we now analyze the quantization efficiency in terms of
the number of feedback bits required for achieving a good
performance. This issue is studied in Fig. 7, which plots the
required number of feedback bits to achieve a high fraction (in
this example, 90%) of the throughput achievable with unlim-
ited feedback. Again, we plot the results as a function of the
secrecy outage constraint ǫ, for different antenna numbers N .
Based on these results, we make the following interesting
observation:
For a reasonable secrecy outage constraint (e.g., ǫ ∈
[0.001, 0.1]), roughly 8 feedback bits per antenna is sufficient
for achieving 90% of the secrecy throughput that would be at-
tainable with perfect knowledge of the desired communication
channel.
Once again, although not shown, in addition to the particular
parameterizations considered in Fig. 7, we also found this
claim to be valid for a wider range of parameters (e.g., P
and N ). While Fig. 7 indicates that 8 bits of feedback
per antenna is sufficient for even reasonably strong outage
constraints, as the secrecy outage constraint becomes very
relaxed or even removed (e.g., ǫ ∈ [0.5, 1]), our additional
numerical studies have revealed that the required number of
feedback bits may indeed be reduced further to around 4
feedback bits per antenna.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Assuming limited feedback from the desired receiver and
no feedback from the eavesdropper, we designed an artificial-
noise-aided beamforming technique that enhances secrecy in
slow fading channels. Our proposed method was designed to
maximize the throughput by adaptively adjusting the wiretap
coding rates and the power allocation between the informa-
tion signal and artificial noise in response to the feedback
information, such that dual connection and secrecy outage
constraints were met. Our analysis provided key insights
into the associated system parameters, such as the optimal
power allocation, the number of feedback bits, the number
of antennas, the imposed outage constraints, and so on. The
proposed method also demonstrated significant differences
with respect to previous designs based on perfect feedback.
In this paper, we assumed that the channel estimation at
the receiver side is perfect, and focused on the design with a
rate-limited feedback link. Possible future extensions include
consideration of practical channel estimation schemes with
optimized pilot design. In addition, scenarios where the desired
receiver and the eavesdropper have multiple antennas are also
of interest and will be important topics for future study.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
First note that the connection outage probability p˜co in (7)
depends on the codeword rate Rb, the secrecy outage prob-
ability pso in (8) depends on the rate redundancy Re, while
both p˜co and pso depend on the power allocation ratio φ. For a
given φ, the connection outage constraint p˜co (Rb, φ, ‖h‖) ≤ σ
implies that the maximum allowable codeword rate is
Rmaxb = log2

1 + ‖h‖2Pφ
(
1− N−1
√
1−σ
2B1
)
‖h‖2 P (1−φ)N−1
N−1
√
1−σ
2B1
+ σ2d

 . (20)
Similarly, under the secrecy outage constraint pso (Re, φ) ≤ ǫ,
the minimum required rate redundancy is given by
Rmine = log2
(
1 +
φ
1− φ
(N − 1)
(
N−1
√
1
ǫ
− 1
))
. (21)
The confidential information rate Rs = Rb − Re is therefore
maximized when Rb = Rmaxb and Re = Rmine . Clearly, to
achieve a positive Rs, we require Rmaxb > Rmine .
Under the ideal scenario where the desired receiver has zero
thermal noise, i.e., nd = 0 (thus σ2d = 0), Rmaxb in (20) admits
Rmaxb |nd=0=log2

1+ φ
1−φ
(N−1)

N−1
√
2B1
1−σ
−1



 (22)
which is independent of the channel strength ‖h‖ and the
transmit power P . Now, from (21) and (22), for Rmaxb |nd=0 >
Rmine to hold requires 2B1/(1− σ) > 1/ǫ, which is indepen-
dent of φ and the number of transmit antennas N . Refor-
mulating this condition in terms of the number of feedback
bits B1 and rounding it up to the nearest integer, we establish
Proposition 1.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
As discussed in Appendix A, the confidential information
rate Rs = Rb − Re is maximized when Rb = Rmaxb and
Re = R
min
e , with Rmaxb and Rmine defined in (20) and (21)
respectively. These quantities depend on the power allocation
ratio φ, which is still to be optimized. In particular, we require
R∗s (h) = max
0<φ<1
[
Rmaxb −R
min
e
]+
. (23)
Here, in contrast to Appendix A, we consider the case where
the thermal noise at the desired receiver is non-negligible, i.e.,
nd ∼ CN
(
0, σ2d
)
with σ2d > 0. For R∗s to be positive entails
Rmaxb > R
min
e for some φ. From (20) and (21), an equivalent
condition is
‖h‖2P
(
1− N−1
√
1−σ
2B1
)
‖h‖2 P (1−φ)N−1
N−1
√
1−σ
2B1
+ σ2d
>
N − 1
1− φ
(
N−1
√
1
ǫ
− 1
)
for some φ, which can be rewritten as
‖h‖2 >
(N − 1)
(
N−1
√
1
ǫ − 1
)
(1− φ)P
(
1− N−1
√
1−σ
2B1 ǫ
)σ2d (24)
for some φ. By letting φ = 0 to minimize the right-hand-side,
we get the minimum channel strength required for achieving
a positive R∗s , reported in Proposition 2.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
With the conditions in (10) and (11) satisfied, by (24), the
range of the power allocation ratio φ that gives a positive
confidential information rate is
0 < φ < φmax := 1−
σ2d (N − 1)
(
N−1
√
1
ǫ − 1
)
‖h‖2P
(
1− N−1
√
1−σ
2B1 ǫ
) .
Then, the optimization problem in (23) reduces to
R∗s (h) = max
0<φ<φmax
Rmaxb −R
min
e
= max
0<φ<φmax
log2


1 +
‖h‖2Pφ
(
1− N−1
√
1−σ
2B1
)
‖h‖2 P(1−φ)
N−1
N−1
√
1−σ
2B1
+σ2
d
1 + φ1−φ (N − 1)
(
N−1
√
1
ǫ − 1
)


where Rmaxb and Rmine are defined in (20) and (21) respec-
tively. Exploiting the monotonicity of the logarithm function,
we solve this by setting the derivative of the quantity inside the
brackets to zero, and keeping the only solution which satisfies
the constraint. The results obtained are then summarized in
Theorem 1.
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